Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) suffer from sensor drifts in GPS denied environments, which can lead to potentially dangerous situations. To avoid intolerable sensor drifts in the presence of GPS spoofing attacks, we propose a safety constrained control framework that adapts the UAV at a path re-planning level to support resilient state estimation against GPS spoofing attacks. The proposed framework includes an attack detector, a resilient state estimator, a robust controller, an attacker location tracker (ALT), and an escape controller (ESC). The attack detector is used to detect GPS spoofing attacks based on the resilient state estimation and provides a switching criterion between the robust control mode and emergency control mode. The robust control mode is on when the GPS is free of attacks. When the GPS spoofing attack is detected, the state estimator only utilizes IMU signals since GPS signals do not contain legitimate information. To quantify the sensor drift due to limited sensor availability, we use the escape time which is defined as a safe time under which the state estimation error remains within a tolerable error with designated confidence. ALT is developed to track the location of the attacker and estimate the output power of the spoofing device by the unscented Kalman filter (UKF) with sliding window outputs. Using the estimates from ALT, ESC is designed based on the constrained model predictive controller (MPC) such that the UAV escapes from the effective range of the spoofing device within the escape time. The numerical simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed resilient safety constrained control framework.
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I. INTRODUCTION
UAVs have been used across the world for commercial, civilian, as well as educational applications over the decades. The mechanical simplicity and agile maneuverability appeal to many applications, such as cargo transportation [1] , aerial photography [2] , and agricultural farming [3] . The most widely used sensor for UAVs is the global positioning system (GPS), which offers accurate and reliable state measurements. However, GPS receivers are vulnerable to various types of attacks, such as blocking, jamming, and spoofing [4] . The Vulnerability Assessment Team at Los Alamos National Laboratory has demonstrated that the civilian GPS spoofing attacks can be easily implemented by using GPS simulator [5] . Furthermore, GPS is more vulnerable when its signal strength is weak. In particular, due to various applications of UAVs, the operating environment becomes diverse as well, where GPS signals are weak or even denied due to other structures such as skyscrapers, elevated highways, bridges, and mountains.
Literature review. One of the GPS spoofing attack detection techniques is to analyze raw antenna signals or utilize multiantenna receiver systems. The GPS spoofing attack can be detected by checking whether the default radiation pattern is changed in [6] . A multi-antenna receiver system was used to detect GPS spoofing attacks by monitoring the angle-ofarrival of the spoofing attempts in [7] . As an extension of this work, the GPS spoofing mitigation has also been investigated where an array of antennas is utilized to obtain genuine GPS signals by spatial filtering (steering beams/nulls) [8] - [10] . However, those solutions usually require modifications of the hardware or the low-level computing modules and assume that an attacker can only use single-antenna spoofing systems. Furthermore, the attacker can spoof the GPS receivers without being detected if multi-antenna spoofing devices are available [11] .
In CPS security literature, GPS spoofing attacks have been described as a malicious signal injection to the genuine sensor output [12] . Attack detection against malicious signal injection has been widely studied over the last few years. The attack detection problem has been formulated as an 0 / ∞ optimization problem, which is non-deterministic polynomial-time hard (NP-hard) in [13] , [14] . The fundamental limitations of structural detectability, as well as graph-theoretical detectability for linear time invariant systems have been studied in [15] , where distributed attack detection has also been studied. The attack detection problem has been formulated as an attack-resilient estimation problem of constrained state and unknown input in [16] . A switching mode resilient detection and estimation framework for GPS spoofing attacks has been studied in [17] . Attack detection using multiple GPS signals by checking cross-correlation was introduced in [18] . In [19] , the maximum deviations of the state were identified due to the sensor attacks while remaining stealthy due to the detection. There have been efforts to design a resilient control architecture. A secure control framework for networked control systems is designed to analyze the resource-limited adversaries [20] . Existing emergency control architectures focus on switching control from a high-performance controller to a robust highassurance controller in the presence of attacks [21] . These architectures can efficiently handle a class of attacks, but cannot address the fundamental problem originated from limited sensor availability in the presence of cyber-attacks.
Contribution. The current paper addresses safety problems induced by limited sensor availability due to GPS spoofing attacks. We formulate the sensor drift problem as an increasing variance of state estimation to quantify the sensor drift and introduce escape time under which the state estimation error remains within a tolerable error with high confidence. We develop a novel safety constrained control framework that adapts the UAV at a path re-planning level to support resilient state estimation against GPS spoofing attacks. The framework consists of an attack detector, a resilient state estimator, a robust controller, an attacker location tracker (ALT) and, an escape controller (ESC). In the presence of the GPS spoofing attack, ALT tracks the attacker's location and estimates the output power of the spoofing device by UKF with sliding window outputs. The estimates are then used in ESC which drives the UAVs away from the effective range of the spoofing device within the escape time to avoid intolerable sensor drift.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we introduce the notation convention in our paper and the dynamic system model. In the same section, we formulate the problem. In Section III, we propose a resilient safety constrained control framework. In Section IV, a numerical simulation of a UAV under the GPS spoofing attack is presented.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section discusses the necessary notation, system model, and the problem statement.
A. Notation
We use the subscript k of x k to denote the time index; R n denotes the n-dimensional Euclidean space; R n + denotes the set of positive elements in the n-dimensional Euclidean space; R n×m denotes the set of all n × m real matrices; A A −1 , diag(A) and tr(A) denote the transpose, inverse, diagonal and trace of matrix A, respectively; I denotes the identity matrix with an appropriate dimension; · denotes the standard Euclidean norm for vector or an induced matrix norm; × is used to denote matrix multiplication when the multiplied terms are in different lines; E[ · ] denotes the expectation operator; P( · ) denotes the probability operator. For a symmetric matrix S, S > 0 and S ≥ 0 indicate that S is positive definite and positive semi-definite, respectively. Finally, for a vector x and a matrix P , (x) i and (P ) i denote the i th row of the vector x and the matrix P .
B. System Model
Consider the discrete-time dynamic system model:
where x k ∈ R n is the state, and A, B, C G , C I and C S are proper sized matrices. There are three types of outputs available. Output y G k ∈ R m G is the GPS measurement which may be corrupted by unknown GPS spoofing signal d k ∈ R m G . Output y I k ∈ R m I is the IMU measurement which returns a noisy measurement of the state difference. Output y S k ∈ R m S represents the GPS signal strength. If GPS is under the attack, it is an inverse function of the distance between the attacker and UAV, where x a k ∈ R n is the unknown attacker location, and η k ∈ R m S is the nominal power of the spoofing device. The function d(a, b) measures the Euclidean distance between a and b. If the UAV receives genuine GPS signals, this output represents the genuine GPS signal strength η S . We assume that the attacker can inject any signal
and v S k are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random variables with zero means and covariances
The sensor measurement y I k represents any relative sensor measurement, such as velocity measurement by a camera. In this paper, we use IMU for the illustration.
Remark 2.2: The signal strength output y S k in (1d) is derived by the GPS signal attenuation due to free-space path loss. Friis transmission equation [22] is given by:
where P t and P r are the transmit power and the receive power; G t and G r are the transmit and receive antenna gains; r is the distance between two antennas; λ is the wavelength. We write G r ( λ 4π ) 2 as the output matrix C S ; G t P t as the nominal power of the spoofing device η k ; and r as the distance between the spoofing device and UAV d(x a k , x k ) in (1d).
C. Problem Statement
Given the system (1) with sensor measurements (GPS, IMU, and GPS signal strength), the defender aims to detect the GPS spoofing attack; achieve attack-resilient state estimation when considering the limited sensor availability, i.e., aims to have the estimation errors within a tolerable bound with a predetermined significance level; complete the global mission securely.
III. SAFETY CONSTRAINED CONTROL FRAMEWORK To address the problem described in Section II-C, we propose a safety constrained control framework in Figure 1 , which consists of an attack detector, a resilient state estimator, a robust controller, an attacker location tracker (ALT), and an escape controller (ESC). The proposed safety constrained control framework drives the UAV to the outside of the effective range of the spoofing device. The following explains each module in the proposed framework as shown in Figure 1 .
Robust control mode. The robust controller is a complex controller that operates the UAV to the destination in the presence of noise, but without the presence of attacks. Any robust/optimal control technique can be implemented to this module.
Emergency control mode. ALT is designed for tracking the location of the attacker and estimating the output power of the spoofing device by applying UKF with sliding window outputs. ESC is an MPC-based controller that drives the UAV out of the effective range of the spoofing device within the escape time based on the estimation of the attacker location obtained by ALT.
Attack-resilient monitor & Decision logic. The resilient state estimator is developed based on the Kalman-filter like state estimator. The attack detector is designed by the χ 2 -based anomaly detection algorithm. Based on the previous estimation from the resilient state estimator, the Boolean output of the attack detector determines i) whether the GPS measurement should be used for the state estimation and ii) the switching rule between two control modes: the robust control mode and the emergency control mode. ALT and ESC adapt the UAV at a path re-planning level for safe operation. In what follows, each subsection describes the details of the corresponding component.
A. Resilient State Estimator
The defender implements an estimator and χ 2 detector to estimate the state and detect the GPS spoofing attack. The following Kalman-filter like state estimator is used to estimate the current state:
wherex k is the state estimate and P k is the state estimation error covariance at time k, and
The optimal gain K k , given by
is the solution of the unconstrained optimization problem min K k tr (P k ).
In [17] , it has been shown that the covariance in (3) is bounded when the GPS signal is available. If the GPS is denied, and only the relative sensor y I k is available, the covariance is strictly increasing and unbounded in time. That is, the sensor drift problem can be formulated as instability of the covariance matrix.
B. Attack Detector
We conduct the χ 2 statistic test to detect the GPS spoofing attacks:
using CUSUM (CUmulative SUM) algorithm, which is widely used in attack detection research [23] - [25] .
given the previous state estimatex k−1 by the state estimator, we estimate the attack vector by comparing the sensor output and the output prediction:
Note that the current estimatex k should not be used for the prediction, because it is correlated with the current output; i.e., E[x k (y G k ) ] = 0. Due to the Gaussian noises w k and v k injected to the linear system in (1), the states follow Gaussian distribution since any finite linear combination of Gaussian distributions is also Gaussian. Similarly,d k is Gaussian as well, and thus the use of χ 2 test (5) is justified 1 . In particular, the χ 2 test compares the normalized attack vector estimated k (P d k ) −1d k with χ 2 df (α):
where
is the threshold found in the Chi-square table. In χ 2 df (α), df denotes the degree of freedom, and α denotes the statistical significance level.
To reduce the effect of noise, we use the test (7) in a cumulative form. The proposed χ 2 CUSUM detector is characterized by the detector state S k ∈ R + :
where 0 < δ < 1 is the pre-determined forgetting factor. At each time k, the CUSUM detector (8) is used to update the detector state S k and detect the attack.
The attacker detector will i) update the estimated statex k and the error covariance P k in (3) with K G k = 0 and ii) switch the control mode to emergency control mode, if
1−δ , then it returns to the robust control mode. Remark 3.1: As shown in Figure 2 , the resilient state estimation uses the GPS measurement and the IMU measurement to estimate the state by (2) for the detection purpose as in (6) . When the GPS attack is detected, only the IMU measurement is used to estimate the state for the control purpose as in (2) and (3) with K G k = 0.
C. Attacker Location Estimation (ALT)
We formulate the simultaneous estimation of the attacker location x a k and unknown parameter η k as a target tracking problem of the attacker state x a k := [(x a k ) , η k ] . Estimating the attacker state x a k encounters two major problems: i) the output equation y S k in (1d) is highly nonlinear, and ii) a single measurement of the signal strength suffers from the infinite number of solutions.
To address the first issue, we use the unscented Kalman filter (UKF) [26] , [27] which has been developed to deal with highly nonlinear systems and provides a better estimation than the extended Kalman filter. Motivated by the fact that locating the epicenter of an earthquake can be done with at least three measurements from different seismic stations, we resolve the second issue by using sliding window outputs. To be specific, GPS measurement and IMU measurement are used in the estimator one (Est. 1). Estimator two (Est. 2) only uses the IMU measurement. Est. 1 is used to estimate the state by (2) for the detection purpose as in (6) . When GPS is free of attacks, Est. 1 is also used to estimate the state for the control purpose since the GPS measurement is trustful. In the presence of the GPS attack, Est. 2 is used for the control purpose.
we estimate x a k+1 using UKF with N -sized sliding window outputs:
The signal strength measurements from (1d) can be written as
The state estimation in (10) by UKF with sliding window outputs can track the location of the moving attacker, while nonlinear regression algorithms may fail to track it.
For completeness of the paper, the UKF with sliding window outputs algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1 in Appendix A with a brief derivation.
D. Escape Controller (ESC)
In the presence of the GPS spoofing attack, the variance P k in (3) of the state estimation errors is strictly increasing and unbounded in time (Theorem 4.2 in [17] ). The goal of ESC is to drive the UAV outside of the effective range of the spoofing device within the escape time so that the state estimation error remains within the tolerable region with a predetermined probability. The escape time is defined in [17] as the following:
Definition 3.1: The escape time k esc ≥ 0 is the time difference between the attack time k a and the first time instance when the estimation error x k −x k is within the tolerable error distance ζ ∈ R n + with the significance α, i.e. k esc = arg min
where P k is the error covariance of x k −x k , df is the degree of freedom of the state. It is worth to notice that the escape time k esc can be calculated by Algorithm 1 in [17] .
The escape time provides a new criterion for optimal trajectory regeneration with increasing uncertainties. In particular, the escape controller (ESC) is designed to drive the UAV outside of the effective range of the spoofing device within the escape time. At the time k, the problem can be formulated as a finite horizon constrained MPC problem:
where N ≥ k esc is the prediction horizon,x i is defined as the difference between the state and the goal state at time index i, i.e.,x i := x i − x goal i , Q i , R i are symmetric positive definite weight matrices,x a i is the estimate of the attacker location. Value r effect is the upper bound of the effective range of the spoofing device, which is assumed to be known by the UAV, since the nominal power of the spoofing device η k is bounded by the hardware constraint. In particular, the constraint (12c) implies that ESC should drive the UAV outside of the effective range of the spoofing device, i.e., d(x a k a +k esc , x k a +k esc ) > r effect . Inequalities (12d) and (12e) are any nonlinear constraints on the state x i (e.g., velocity) and the control input u i (e.g., acceleration).
There are two key challenges for the MPC problem in (12) that the states x k · · · x k+N and the attacker's position x a k a +k esc are unknown and their estimates are subject to stochastic noise. Moreover, we cannot always guarantee that the program (12) is feasible due to the constraint (12c); i.e., the UAV may not be able to leave the effective range of the spoofing device within the escape time.
To address the above issues, we approximate the MPC problem (12) by the certainty equivalence principle and reformulate the hard constraint (12c) to a soft constraint. Given the estimations of UAV statex k and attacker statex a k with their covariances, we reformulate the problem (12) as the following:
for i = k, k + 1, · · · , k + N,
is the repulsive potential function [28] . The state x i is replaced with its estimatex i .
Since the constraint (12c) is the safety critical constraint, we can reformulate it as a conservative constraint such that ESC should drive the UAV outside of the effective range of the spoofing device with probability γ: P(d(x a k a +k esc ,x k a +k esc ) − r effect > 0) > γ or equivalently d(x a k a +k esc ,x k a +k esc ) − r effect > e(P k a +k esc , P a k , γ), (14) where P k a +k esc is the UAV state covariance at escape time, and P a k is the attacker state covariance. The range of the function e(·) can be seen as a robust margin to fulfill the second constraint in (12c). Then, the hard constraint (14) is replaced by the repulsive potential function as a high penalty in the cost function which is active only after the escape time k a + k esc . The repulsive potential function U rep (D) is defined as the following:
which can be constructed based on the distance between the location of the attacker and the location of UAV, D := d(x a k a +k esc ,x k a +k esc ). The scaling parameter β is a large constant, which represents a penalty when the constraint has not been fulfilled.
The problem (13) is a non-convex nonlinear programming problem, which can be solved by the nonlinear programming algorithms such as sequential quadratic programming (SQP) [29] , [30] .
Remark 3.2: Comparing to the employments of the repulsive potential function U rep in the collision avoidance literature [31] - [33] , the proposed application of the repulsive potential function in (13) has two differences. First of all, the repulsive potential function is known before the collision happens in collision avoidance literature, while we can only get the repulsive potential function U rep after the collision happens, i.e., only after the UAV has entered the effective range of the spoofing device. Secondly, the repulsive potential function U rep is only counted in the cost function in (13) after the escape time.
IV. SIMULATION
In the simulation scenario, the UAV is moving from the start position with the coordinates at (0, 0) to the target position (300, 300) by using feedback control 2 based on the state estimate from the state estimator in (2) . When the GPS attack happens, the state estimate will be no longer trustful. After GPS measurement is turned off, the only available relative state measurement causes the sensor drift problem [17] . The UAV will switch the control mode from the robust control mode to the emergency control mode when the attack is detected, using ESC to escape away from the attacker within the escape time.
A. UAV Model
We use a double integrator UAV dynamics under the GPS spoofing attack as in [34] . The discrete time state vector x k considers planar position and velocity at time step k, i.e.
where r x k , r y k denote x, y position coordinates, and v x k , v y k denote velocity coordinates. We consider the acceleration of UAV as the control input u k = [u x k , u y k ] . We assume that the state constraint and control input constraint are given as
(
With sampling time at 0.1 seconds, the double integrator model is discretized into the following matrices:
and the outputs y G k , y I k and y S k are the position measurements from GPS, the velocity measurements from IMU, and GPS signal strength measurements respectively, with the output matrices:
The covariance matrices of the sensing and disturbance noises are chosen as Σ w = 0.1I, Σ G = I, Σ I = 0.01I, Σ S = I.
B. Attack Signal Estimation
The GPS attack happens when the UAV is in the effective range of the spoofing device. In this attack scenario, the attack signal is d = [10, 10] . The location of the attacker and the nominal power of the spoofing device are x a k = [100, 100] and η k = 200, which are both unknown to the UAV. The estimation of the attack signal obtained by (6) is shown in Figure 3 . 
C. Attack Detection
Using the estimated attack signal to calculate the detector state S k by (8), the attack detector is able to detect the attack using the normalized attack vector as shown in Figure 4 . In Figure 4 , there are abnormal high detector state values, which imply that there is an attack. Statistic significance of the attack is tested using the CUSUM detector described in (9) with the significance α at 1%. 
D. Attacker State Estimation
When the GPS attack is detected, the UAV first estimates the attacker state x a k by using Algorithm 1. The estimation result is shown in Figure 5 . The estimated location and the estimated nominal power quickly converge to the true values. The estimations are drifting due to the fact that the state estimation errors are strictly increasing and unbounded when the UAV remains in GPS denied environment. After obtaining the attacker state, ESC is used to escape away from the effective range of the spoofing device. As shown in Figure 7 , the state estimation error x k −x k is increasing when the UAV is in the effective range of the spoofing device, and the error is bounded by the tolerable error distance ζ = 3. Regardless of the size of r effect , the UAV will escape the effective range within the escape time. The UAV can pass the attacker without changing the direction or even its speed, when the effective range of the spoofing device is small enough.
V. CONCLUSION
We present a secure safety constrained control framework that adapts the UAV at a path re-planning level to support resilient state estimation against GPS spoofing attacks. A resilient state estimator has been designed and the χ 2 CUSUM algorithm is used for attack detection. In the presence of the GPS spoofing attack, the state estimation suffers from increasing variance due to the limited sensor availability. In this case, using the robust controller may still keep the UAV within the effective range of the spoofing device after the estimation errors may not be in the tolerable region. The large estimation error will give rise to safety problems. To solve this safety problem, ALT is developed for tracking the attacker location and estimating the effective range of the spoofing device by using UKF with sliding window outputs. Then, ESC is used to escape away from the effective range of the spoofing device within the escape time. A UAV simulation is given to demonstrate the results.
APPENDIX
The current appendix presents the UKF algorithm statement and its brief derivation for partially nonlinear systems with sliding window outputs.
A. UKF with sliding window outputs
Consider the system:
where x k ∈ R n is the state, the output y k ∈ R m represents the measurement of GPS signal strength. The noise signals w k and v k are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random variables with zero means and covariances
Algorithm Derivation. 1) Prediction: Given the previous state estimatex k−1 and system model (15) , the current state can be predicted aŝ
Its error covariance matrix is
where P k−1 := E[(x k−1 −x k−1 )(x k−1 −x k−1 ) ] is the state estimation error covariance matrix.
2) Sigma Points Generation: We defined a sigma points array X k := {x k|k−1 ± ( nP k|k−1 ) i , i = 1, · · · , n}, where nP k|k−1 is the matrix square root such that nP k|k−1 nP k|k−1 = nP k|k−1 , and the matrix operator (·) i gives the i th row of the matrix.
3) Measurement Update: Given the sliding window size N , the nonlinear measurement equation f (·) is used to transform the sigma points into predicted measurement vectorŝ
Algorithm 1 UKF with sliding window outputs Prediction 1:x k|k−1 = A k−1xk−1 ; 2: P k|k−1 = A k−1 P k−1 A k−1 + Σ w ; Sigma points generation 3: X k = {x k|k−1 ± ( nP k|k−1 ) i }, i ∈ {1, · · · , n}; Measurement Update 4: for i = 1 : 2n do
i=0 W i k (X i k −x k|k−1 )(ŷ i k −ȳ k ) ; 10: K k = P xy k (P y k ) −1 11:x k =x k|k−1 + K k (y k −ȳ k ); 12: P k = P k|k−1 − K k P y k K k and we defineŷ i k := (ŷ i k ,ŷ i k−1 , · · · ,ŷ i k−N +1 ) . The approximated mean of the measurements is defined bȳ
where W i k are the weighting coefficients. By taking the measurement noises into account, the estimated covariance of the predicted measurements is given by:
where Σ v = diag{Σ v , · · · , Σ v } is the diagonal matrix. The cross covariance between the state prediction and predicted measurements is
where X i k denotes the i th element in X k . The measurement y k := [y k , · · · , y k−N +1 ] is used to update the propagated predictionx k|k−1 asx k =x k|k−1 + K k (y k −ȳ k ).
The covariance matrix of the state estimation error is P k = P k|k−1 − K k (P xy k ) − P xy k K k + K k P y k K k . The gain matrix K k is chosen by minimizing the trace norm of P k ; i.e. min K k tr (P k ). The solution of the program is given by K k = P xy k (P y k ) −1 .
Note that the prediction step does not need unscented transformation because the dynamic system (15) is linear.
